But Mr Doval did undeniably well on keeping the public opinion united on pursuing talks with Pakistan, no matter how Pathankot turned out. The then National Democratic Alliance government had to release three imprisoned terrorists in return for the aircraft and hostages.Now, at the start of 2016, the Punjab Police is again not looking good. Pathankot is the second major terror event where the Punjab Police has not covered itself with glory. When he escaped and alerted his force, it did nothing. On Christmas Eve, 1999, flight IC-814 from Kathmandu was hijacked and it landed in Amritsar for around 50 minutes before eventually taking off landing in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

That the Army is ready to criticise the NSA, and that so many were quick to savage Mr Doval should, perhaps, occasion some introspection. The delay in closing the operation has given the impression that there was disarray on the ground; perhaps the anti-terrorist operation lacked a single point of authority — or, as has been alleged by some, on-the-ground authority was usurped by an over-enthusiastic NSA, whose career’s successes include the 1988 Black Thunder operation to flush militants out of the Golden Temple. They have cited the Army’s operations in flushing out militants from the mountains and forests of Kashmir. While finance minister Arun Jaitley pointed out that the airbase covered a significant area, with a rough circumference of 24 km, the delay perhaps would not have been an issue had it not been for the casualties, or for the unfortunate announcement on Twitter by home minister Rajnath Singh at the end of January 2 that the operation was over. The day after the attack, national newspapers in unison editorialised that the talks must go on. Former Punjab Police director-general K.But there is one critical success of Mr Doval’s that has been overlooked in the Pathankot attack. This is their way of "testing our sincerity" in pursuing dialogue, the way we keep wondering about Pakistan’s sincerity in pursuing peace. This is disingenuous. The operation against a terrorist attack or siege is a more targeted affair and mist sprayer Manufacturers is an anti-terrorism operation in nature.Along with the National Investigation Agency (NIA) inquiry into the terrorist attack on the Pathankot airbase, the Punjab government’s report to the Union home ministry, the Indian Air Force’s own court of inquiry to probe alleged lapses, and the usual round of futile soul-searching, two mysteries arose during the four-day long anti-terrorism operation: the inexplicable delay by the Punjab Police once the infiltration of terrorists came to light, and why the Army was not directing the operation once the attack began. Mr Doval acted correctly in calling it in. Gurdaspur superintendent of police (HQ) Salwinder Singh was abducted and his SUV (with the blue beacon) commandeered late night new year’s eve. And at the Crisis Management Group in Delhi, there was plenty of advice (the Intelligence Bureau told Punjab Police to deflate the aircraft tyres, as if it were a bicycle) and finger-pointing (the National Security Guard was blamed for not mobilising to Amritsar airport rapidly enough), but little else.

The Punjab Police, not surprisingly in damage-control mode, claims that they are the ones who put the nation on alert after Salwinder’s abduction story was confirmed. There was no dissent. He claimed there were "four-five" men with AK-47s, as did his cook. That still leaves a gap of about four hours in which the Punjab Police sat on its hands. It is no secret that Pakistan’s "deep state" was involved. Deputy chief minister Sukhbir Singh Badal has tried deflecting blame from his force by pointing out that the lack of vigilance by central forces on the border allowed the infiltration. The government has been criticised for its poor media management, and no immediate answers on the pre-attack and the operation’s delay means that one aim of terrorism was achieved: publicity. More incredibly, the police say that by the time they were ready to search and secure Pathankot, it was too dark to do so.The anti-terrorism operation inside the airbase has attracted criticism, perhaps because the lives of security personnel were lost. The NSG, on the other hand, has a proven track record in anti-terrorist operations — even 26/11 is a testament to that. And in the early hours of January 2, the terrorists struck. The foreign service, for example, has been seething at the way it perceives his hijacking of its domain, bypassing its institutional memory, particularly in relation to Pakistan.P. There was also criticism of the role of national security adviser Ajit Doval, who was alleged to have micromanaged the operation. But once the terrorists were on Indian soil, they became the responsibility of the Punjab Police. Incidentally, Mr Doval was one of the negotiators sent to Kandahar; one of the terrorists released was Maulana Masood Azhar who later created the Jaish-e-Mohammad, suspected of the Pathankot attack. The cook says the police did not believe him, astounding since there was an intelligence alert on December 30 itself.S. Gill, credited with leading from the front against the Khalistan movement, criticised the force’s inability to at least ground IC-814.Aditya Sinha is the co-author of the recent bestseller Kashmir: The Vajpayee Years.It is ironic that some commentators have said that the command of the anti-terrorist operation should have been handed over to the Army. First, flushing out operations are part of counter-terrorism operations, which are general in nature and come under a counter-insurgency strategy.

The then Punjab DGP, Sarabjit Singh, later privately confessed that unlike Mr Gill, he found himself unable to take a bold initiative; even his state government — led by the same Akali Dal and Badal family as now — advised him to wait for orders from New Delhi. That may be true. Second, after the disastrous Operation Bluestar in 1984, the Army has been reluctant to take on anti-terrorist operations over the years, preferring to provide support.